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Arguably one of the seminal challenges of the twenty-first century will be the place of public 
international law, particularly in its manifestation in what may be termed the global security 
system. The importance of this has been shown by the controversial 2003 American-led 
invasion of Iraq. While the initial concerns about the legality of the invasion have largely 
receded, questions about the relationship of international law, state sovereignty, and the 
global security system, which the invasion raised, remain. 
This paper will assess some of the possible implications for the global security system of 
the Iraq war, and possible post-war developments in the law of war. It will review the process 
of development of international law. It concludes with an evaluation of some of the lessons of 
the war for the international community. In essence it will ask what is the effect of the 
invasion on international law, and how might the global security system be revitalised. 
 
 
2 HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW MAY BE AFFECTED BY THE IRAQ INVASION 
 
Hugo Grotius, in his classic treatise on international law, On the Law of War and Peace (De 
Jure Belli ac Pacis), proposed an ideal that moral laws apply to both the individual and the 
state equally.  
In particular this included what were known as the laws of law. Just war theory deals with 
the justification of how and why wars are fought. The justification can be either theoretical or 
historical. The theoretical aspect is concerned with ethically justifying war and forms of 
warfare. The historical aspect, or the “just war tradition” deals with the historical body of 
rules or agreements applied (or at least existing) in various wars across the ages. For instance 
international agreements such as the Geneva and Hague conventions are historical rules aimed 
at limiting certain kinds of warfare.  
Historically, the just war tradition – a set of mutually agreed rules of combat – commonly 
evolves between two similar enemies. When enemies differ greatly because of different 
religious beliefs, race, or language, war conventions have rarely been applied. It is only when 
the enemy is seen to be a people with whom one will do business in the following peace that 
tacit or explicit rules are formed for how wars should be fought and who they should involve. 
In part the motivation is seen to be mutually beneficial – it is preferable to remove any 
underhand tactics or weapons that may provoke an indefinite series of vengeance acts. 
Nonetheless, it has been the concern of the majority of just war theorists that such 
asymmetrical morality should be denounced, and that the rules of war should apply to all 
equally.  
Whilst parts of the Bible hint at ethical behaviour in war and concepts of just cause, the 
most systematic exposition is given by Saint Thomas Aquinas. In the Summa Theologicae 
Aquinas presents the general outline of what becomes the just war theory. He discusses not 
only the justification of war, but also the kinds of activity that are permissible in war. 
Aquinas’s thoughts become the model for later Scholastics and Jurists to expand.1 In the 
twentieth century it underwent a revival mainly in response to the invention of nuclear 
                                                          
1 The most important of these are: Francisco de Vitoria (1548-1617), Francisco Suarez (1548-
1617), Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), Samuel Pufendorf (1632-1704), Christian Wolff (1679-
1754), and Emerich de Vattel (1714-1767).   
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weaponry and other factors including American involvement in the Vietnam war.2 It has now 
been revisited due to the Iraq war, but so far without a clear outcome. This raises two parallel 
questions: the first is what the basis of the law is? The second is what the proper means of 
regulating war is? 
The strategic doctrine of the Bush administration, laid out in The National Security 
Strategy of the United States of America,3 highlights a significant shift from beliefs that 
dominated Cold War strategic thought. The new doctrine goes beyond the Cold War strategy 
of deterrence,4 to one which backs pre-emptive attacks against terrorists, and states which 
harbour them5 and states with weapons of mass destruction.6 This doctrine may have 
profound implications for the world security environment, and for international law, for it is 
contrary to the previously developed norms of international law, which stressed collective 
security and the maintenance of world peace through the United Nations system. The new 
doctrine was applied in full in March 2003, with the US-led attacks on Iraq.7  
 The war on Iraq may be central to the development of the “new world order” in the first 
half of the 21st century. For, despite its justification by the US and its allies as a police action 
to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction – or any of the other reasons given for 
attacking Iraq – the US acted largely outside the pre-existing international legal order.8 This 
unilateralist attitude was illustrated by the US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, who 
wrote that defending the US required both prevention and, sometimes, pre-emptive action.9 
International law prescribes limited circumstances in which offensive military action may 
occur, and it is doubtful that the Iraqi situation qualified.10 However, it may be that this 
approach to the law of war reflects a theoretical, rather than historical, justification. Given the 
changing strategic situation it may be that this is no less valid an approach and indeed it may 
be more appropriate in an era in which the primary opponents are ideologically-driven sub-
state groups, rather than nation-states. 
                                                          
2 The most important contemporary texts include M. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (1977), B. 
Paskins & M. Dockrill, The Ethics of War (1979), R. Norman, Ethics, Killing, and War 
(1995), as well as seminal articles by Thomas Nagel, ‘War and Massacre’, Elizabeth 
Anscombe, ‘War and Murder’, and a number of others, commonly found in the journals 
Ethics or The Journal of Philosophy and Public Affairs.  
3 (17 September 2002) <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html> (‘US National Security 
Strategy’). 
4 F. Boyle, Nuclear Deterrence and International Law (1999). 
5 Such as the operations against the al-Qaeda in Afghanistan; ‘Limited success in war on al-
Qaeda’ <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/2638437.stm/>. 
6 Such as Iraq, and possibly, for the future, North Korea. 
7 ‘US launches huge attack on Iraq’, 20 March 2003, 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2869121.stm> at 21 March 2003. 
8 For example, see the views of the French and German leaders (18 March 2003) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2860715.stm>. 
9 ‘Transforming the Military’, Foreign Affairs Magazine (May-June 2002). 
10 C. Banham, ‘Experts at odds as PM releases legal advice’, 19 March 2003, 
<http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/03/18/1047749774530.html>; Public Issues 
Committee of the Auckland District Law Society, ‘International law, the United Nations and 
Iraq’, <http://www.adls.org.nz/public/media/media6.asp>; ‘New York City Bar Urges No US 
Military Action in Iraq 
Without UN Security Council Authorization’, 15 October 2002, 
<http://www.abcny.org/currentarticle/abcny_%20Urges_No_US_Military.html>. 
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Ironically – but perhaps unsurprisingly – in the aftermath of the war, faced with scepticism 
at home and abroad over claims of weapons of mass destruction, and an increasingly costly 
occupation, the US had been compelled to back down from its previous pure principle, in 
favour of limited concession to multilateralism. This may offer an opportunity for the world 
security system to develop a theoretical response to a problem which has been dominated by 
an historical approach for over a century.  
 
 
3 THE CONTEXT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
It may be that the American position on Iraq in 2003 reflects international law, either as it 
stands now, or as it may be in the future. For this reason it is useful to briefly look at the 
context of international law. Public international law regulates relations between nations. That 
part which relates to military action is generally known as the Law of Armed Conflict, or 
anciently as the Laws of War. War is both a state of “armed, physical contest between 
nations”, and “a legal condition of armed hostility between states”.11 In common with those 
aspects of international law which do not relate directly to the Law of Armed Conflict, the 
sources of international law include written and unwritten rules, treaties, agreements, and 
customary law. These principally relate to states, for states were for long the dominant – if not 
sole – participants in international diplomacy and law. 
Traditionally the laws of war were concerned with the regulation of warfare,12 usually, 
though not exclusively, state warfare.13 Additionally, since the nineteenth century there has 
been significant growth in the laws of humanity, or human rights.14 It has been said that these 
two strands have joined.15 There has been much concentration on humanitarian law, and 
                                                          
11 Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis (1625). 
12 G. Kewley, International Law in Armed Conflicts (1984). 
13 H. Wilson, International Law and the Use of Force by National Liberation Movements 
(1988). Laws were allowed, in the view of St Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century, if it 
was by sovereign authority, accompanied by a just cause, and supported by the right intention 
of the belligerents; St Thomas Aquinas, ‘Summa theologica’, Secunda secundae, Quaestio XL 
(de bello), quoted in J. Eppstein, The Catholic Tradition of the Law of Nations (1935) 83; V. 
Elbe, ‘The Evolution of the Concept of the Just War in International Law’ (1939) 33 
American Journal of International Law 669. 
14 G. Best, War and Law since 1945 (1994); L.C. Green, The Contemporary Law of Armed 
Conflict (1993); C. Swinarski (ed), Studies and Essays on International Humanitarian Law 
and Red Cross Principles (1984); M. Bothe, K. Partsch & W. Solf, New Rules for Victims of 
Armed Conflict (1982); J. Pictet, Humanitarian Law and the Protection of War Victims 
(1982); G. Best, Humanity in Warfare: The Modern History of the International Law of 
Armed Conflict (1980); A. Cassese (ed), The New Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict 
(1979); F. Karlshoven, The Law of Warfare (1973); G. Draper, ‘The Geneva Convention of 
1949’, 114 Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de droit international 59; G. Draper, 
‘Implementation and Enforcement of the Geneva Conventions and of the Two Additional 
Protocols’, 164 Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de droit international 1. Consideration of 
human rights obligations have become central to planning military operations; F. Rogers, 
‘Australia’s Human Rights Obligations and ADF Operations’, (1988) 131 Australian Defence 
Force Journal 41-44. 
15 Lt-Col F. Thorogood, ‘War Crimes: How Do We Define Them and Punish the Criminals?’ 
(1996) 119 Australian Defence Force Journal 4-16. 
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especially the punishment of war criminals.16 But the basic question of when it is lawful to 
start an offensive war has received less attention, if it has not been ignored althogether.17  
It would be simplistic to assume that individual states alone determined what international 
law comprised, or that they were always equally significant. A look at history, however, tells 
us that conceptions of world order have by no means always been shaped by the model of 
sovereign co-equal actors with a territorial basis. 
While it is possible for organisations and individuals to be subjects of international law, 
States remain the dominant agents in world politics and the dominant actors in international 
law. This dominance has led some theorists to distinguish “subjects” of the law from 
“objects” of the law, suggesting that although entities other than States may have rights and 
duties in international law, these rights are conferred upon them by States and, presumably, 
may be taken away by States.18 It is possibly more correct now to regard international law as a 
body of rules that binds States and other agents in world politics in their relations with one 
another, and that is considered to have the status of law.19 This is becoming increasingly 
irrelevant. 
The 20th century, and particularly the second half of that century, saw the growth of 
international organisations and other bodies now accorded recognition as subjects in 
international law. With the growth in both the extent and the reach of international 
agreements, treaties, conventions and codes, the extent to which individual sovereign States 
retain the final control over their national policies may have diminished.20 This tendency is 
becoming more noticeable in the modern commercial environment, and especially in respect 
of the internet. The principal of these international bodies was the United Nations, which, in 
succession to the League of Nations, took a leading role in the post-World War II global 
security system. It may be true that the Iraq war involved one state (or coalition of states) 
against another, but it was very much linked with the broader US war against terrorism – the 
historical justification was largely inapplicable.  
 
 
                                                          
16 Lt-Col F. Thorogood, ‘War Crimes: How Do We Define Them and Punish the Criminals?’ 
(1996) 119 Australian Defence Force Journal 4-16; G. Simpson, ‘Nuremberg Revisited? The 
United Nations War Crimes Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’, International Law News 
(February 1994). There is, however, no unified system of sanctions in international law; W. 
M. Reisman, ‘Sanctions and Enforcement’ in C. Black & R. A. Falk (eds), The Future of the 
International Legal Order (1971) 273; S. Schwebel (ed), The Effectiveness of International 
Decisions (1971); G. Fitzmaurice, ‘The Foundations of the Authority of International Law 
and the Problem of Enforcement’, (1956) 19 Modern Law Review 1; J. Brierly, ‘Sanctions’ 
(1932) 17 Transactions of the Grotius Society 68. 
17 C. af Jochnick & R. Normand, ‘The Legitimation of Violence: a Critical History of the 
Laws of War’ (1994) 35 Harvard International Law Review 72. See J. Gillingham and J. C. 
Holt (eds), War and Government in the Middle Ages (1984). 
18 G. Schwarzenberger & E.D. Brown, A Manual of International Law (6th ed., 1976) 42. 
19 H. Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (1977) 127; E. 
Lauterpacht, ‘The Subjects of the Law of Nations’ (1947) 63 Law Quarterly Review 444; R. 
Higgins, The Development of International Law Through the Political Organs of the UN 
(1963) 1; P. Jessup, A Modern Law of Nations (1968); J.G. Castel, International Law: Chiefly 
as Interpreted and Applied in Canada (3rd ed., 1976) 1. 
20 Though even in the heyday of State sovereignty, the late 19th century, the extent to which 
any State was truly independent depended much on non-legal factors, such as relative 
economic strength. 
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4 US POLICY TOWARDS IRAQ AND THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 
 
US policy towards Iraq was driven largely by the American perception of global security.21 In 
accordance with the newly developing US world view, it was incumbent upon the US to take 
action, including military action where necessary, against any and every potential threat.22 In 
classic laws of war terminology this might be thought of as theoretical rather than historical. 
The question of whether such action was legally justified in international law was one which 
was either disregarded, or left to others – particularly the UK – to annunciate.23 That is not to 
say that international law per se was disregarded, or international organisations such as the 
UN ignored.24 But it did mean that the settled norms of international law, to which many 
smaller countries attached primacy, was not determinative in US strategic thinking.25 It was 
simply that a historic approach, based on technical rules and precedents, was deemed 
inapplicable to a new, highly fluid, environment. 
Whatever the political, military or diplomatic reasons for taking aggressive military action 
against Iraq, there were (broadly speaking) four possible legal justifications. These were 
humanitarian grounds (as used in 1999 to authorise the Balkan operations);26 Iraq’s support 
for terrorism in the past and its (alleged) possession of weapons of mass destruction;27 a 
                                                          
21  US National Security Strategy. 
22  ‘Transforming the Military’, ibid. 
23 Secretary of State Colin Powell, ‘Briefing on Situation With Iraq’, 17 March 2003, 
<http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2003/18771.htm>: 
 
We believe and I think you’ve also heard an opinion from British legal authorities 
within the last 24 hours that there is sufficient authority in 1441, 678 and 687, earlier 
resolutions, for whatever military action might be required. 
 
24 A UN Security Council resolution to use force was being sought until the last several 
weeks, though the US Government denied that this was a legal necessity; White House Press 
Secretary Ari Fleischer, ‘Bush to Address Nation on Iraq’, 
<http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/03031701.htm>. 
25 In contrast to the position maintained by the New Zealand Government, and that of the US 
at time of the Caroline incident in 1837.  Rt Hon Helen Clark, ‘Statement to Parliament on 
the Iraq crisis’, 18 March 2003, 
<http://www.beehive.govt.nz/ViewDocument.cfm?DocumentID=16266>: ‘New Zealand’s 
position on this crisis has at all times been based on its strong support for multilateralism and 
the rule of law, and for upholding the authority of the Security Council’. 
26 It is sometimes argued that there is a right to use armed force against a State without 
Security Council authorisation where moral imperatives demand intervention in order to 
prevent massive and grave violations of human rights: A. Roberts, ‘Humanitarian War: 
Military Intervention and Human Rights’ (1993) 69 International Affairs 429; E. Mooney, 
‘Presence ergo Protection? UNPROFOR, UNHCR and ICRC in former Yugoslavia’ (1995) 7 
International Journal of Refugee Law 436; M. Hutchinson, ‘Restoring Hope: Security 
Council Resolutions for Somalia and an Expanded Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention’ 
(1993) 34 Harvard International Law Journal 624; N. Cox, ‘Developments in the Laws of 
War: NATO attacks on Yugoslavia and the use of force to achieve humanitarian objectives’ 
[2002] NZAFLR 13. 
27 ‘President Says Saddam Hussein Must Leave Iraq Within 48 Hours’, 
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030317-7.html>. 
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related argument based on anticipatory self-defence (‘pre-emption’);28 and alleged material 
breach of UN Security Council resolution 1441, reviving resolution 678.29 The US seems to 
have relied upon all four – and particularly the third.30 The UK relied upon the last,31 as being 
arguably the strongest. The specific details of these arguments – except for the last two – will 
not be examined in this paper. But the context in which they were placed – the world security 
system – will be.  
 
 
5 JUS AD BELLUM AND IRAQ 
 
As mentioned earlier, not every exercise of military force is lawful. Rules have developed 
over time to control and regulate war, and the tendency over the past few centuries has been 
to limit the freedom of sovereign states to levy war.32 The UN Charter in particular, designed 
to promote peace, enshrined a growing tendency to prohibit all wars not waged in self-
defence,33 though it does allow collective self-defence,34 and the restoration of international 
peace.35 This left little room for the ‘just war’,36 a concept which has nevertheless 
increasingly once again reared its head in the law on the use of force – the jus ad bellum.37 
Whether seen as historically or theoretically-based, this doctrine has been central to the laws 
of war, in particular as applied by sovereign states. 
The US-led attack on Iraq could be justified within the framework of modern international 
law on the use of force. It might have been designed to force compliance with UN resolutions, 
but it was not expressly authorised by the UN.38 Nor did it resemble traditional peacekeeping 
missions, or defensive military actions, such as the British action for the recovery of the 
                                                          
28 Idem. Antonio Cassese has observed that ‘[i]n the case of anticipatory self-defence, it is 
more judicious to consider such action as legally prohibited while admittedly  knowing there 
may be cases where breaches of the prohibition may be justified on moral and political 
grounds and the community will eventually condone them or meet out lenient 
condemnations’; (2001) International Law 307-311. 
29 D. Rothwell, ‘US and its allies threaten rule of international law’, New Zealand Herald, 17 
March 2003. 
30 ‘President Says Saddam Hussein Must Leave Iraq Within 48 Hours’, ibid. 
31 ‘War and law: Attorney General statement’, The Times (London), 17 March 2003 (‘The 
Times statement’). 
32 See N. Cox, ‘Developments in the Laws of War: NATO attacks on Yugoslavia and the use 
of force to achieve humanitarian objectives’ [2002] NZAFLR 13. 
33 Ibid. 
34 By states acting in accordance with Article 51. 
35 By the Security Council in accordance with Article 42.  
36 See discussion of this concept in N. Cox, ‘Developments in the Laws of War: NATO 
attacks on Yugoslavia and the use of force to achieve humanitarian objectives’ [2002] 
NZAFLR 13. 
37 N. Cox, ‘Developments in the Laws of War: NATO attacks on Yugoslavia and the use of 
force to achieve humanitarian objectives’ [2002] NZAFLR 13. 
38 The UN normally enforces its own resolutions; Michael Reisman, ‘Sanctions and 
Enforcement’ in C.E. Black & R. Falk (eds), The Future of the International Legal Order 
(1971) 273; S. Schwebel (ed), The Effectiveness of International Decisions (1971); G. 
Fitzmaurice, ‘The Foundations of the Authority of International Law and the Problem of 
Enforcement’ (1956) 19 Modern Law Review 1; J. Brierly, ‘Sanctions’ (1932) 17 
Transactions of the Grotius Society 68. 
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Falkland Islands in 1982.39 That is not to say, however, that the US necessarily acted 
unlawfully in attacking Iraq. But the legal basis for its action was at best uncertain.40 This 
raises serious questions for the world security system. But it has not spelt the end of the 
existing system, despite some initial pessimistic assessments. If it cannot fit comfortably into 
an historical framework, merely describing it as illegal is unhelpful and possibly simplistic. 
We must turn to the second possible basis for legality of jus ad bellum. This could be for 
individual states to define, but we have an existing system which could be utilised.  
 
 
6 ROLE OF THE UN 
 
As the global security system is currently understood, the UN Security Council alone has the 
power to make a binding determination in international law that a situation constitutes a threat 
to international peace and security:  
 
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of 
the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what 
measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore 
international peace and security.41 
 
Article 41 of the UN Charter provides for a range of non-military measures which the 
Security Council may authorise to deal with such a situation and, if they prove ineffective, 
article 42 permits more direct action: 
 
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be 
inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land 
forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such 
action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land 
forces of Members of the UN. 
 
This is a predominantly historical basis for the laws of law. However, while the UN itself 
can take or authorise military action, the Charter does not necessarily exclude the possibility 
of unilateral action by individual states in certain circumstances. This is recognised by article 
51: 
 
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective 
self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the UN, until the Security 
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. 
Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be 
immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the 
authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at 
any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international 
peace and security. 
                                                          
39 A. Coll & A. Arend (eds), The Falklands War – Lessons for Strategy, Diplomacy and 
International Law (1985). 
40 See A. Arend & R. Beck, International Law and the Use of Force: Beyond the UN Charter 
Paradigm (1993); J. Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will: International Diplomacy and the 
Yugoslav War (1997). 
41 UN Charter, article 39. 
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This article clearly limits the scope of self-defence to interim measures – any solution 
adopted is always subject to subsequent Security Council action. However, it does not cover 
situations where the Security Council has failed, for some reason, to reach agreement on 
taking action. Aggressive war is no longer a legitimate instrument of national policy, but the 
use of force is not necessarily limited or reserved to the UN alone. Thus, although the general 
rules for the conduct of international relations may be categorised as historical, there may be 
additional theoretical justifications available – particularly those based on ethical 
considerations. 
Many international lawyers argued that, in the context of the UN Charter, the attack on 
Iraq was unlawful at international law given the circumstances in which it occurred.42 It was 
argued that the action was neither based on a Security Council decision under Chapter VII 
(which will be considered below), nor taken in individual or collective self-defence under 
article 51, the only two justifications for the use of force that are currently clearly available 
under international law.43  
Whether this view of international law is correct depends on whether the law of war has 
now accommodated, or is in the process of accommodating, wars conducted for humanitarian 
purposes or to reduce the risk of more widespread war.44 The latter ground is particularly 
important as a possible justification for action, but runs counter to the general trend of legal 
developments over the past few centuries. In particular, it appears to be inconsistent with the 
UN Charter, though the principle protagonists in the 2003 Iraqi war relied upon Security 
Council resolutions to justify the use of force.45  
However, it is also true that the post-World War II security system was in need of radical 
reform, with the end of the Cold War, and that in this new strategic environment theoretical 
justifications for war are more important that historical. The former may be immutable, the 
latter founded on strategic situations which may no longer be relevant. The UN could work on 
the theoretical basis of the law of war – because the focus is no longer on states, less relevant 
for states alone to develop principles of law. We could see signs of this developing in the 
ongoing diplomacy surrounding the US involvement in Iraq. 
 
 
7 THE OPENING OF HOSTILITIES WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE UN 
 
The post-World War II security system did allow some freedom of action for states. The 
exercise of independent action by the US and its allies was not necessarily contrary to the UN 
Charter. Article 1 of the Charter states that one of the purposes of the UN is:  
                                                          
42 For just two examples, see Foreign Policy In Focus Statement, ‘Lawyers Statement on UN 
Resolution’, 5 December 2002, <http://fpif.org/commentary/2002/0212lawyers.html>; ‘No 
legal justification’ 608 Al-Ahram (Cairo, Egypt), 17 – 23 October 2002, 
<http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2002/608/op12.htm>. 
43 Humanitarian intervention not being recognised yet (and probably inapplicable in any 
case). See O. Bring, ‘Should NATO take the lead in formulating a doctrine on humanitarian 
intervention’ (1999) 3 NATO Review 24, 25. 
44 See N. Cox, ‘Developments in the Laws of War: NATO attacks on Yugoslavia and the use 
of force to achieve humanitarian objectives’ [2002] NZAFLR 13. 
45 The Times statement; Press Briefing by Ari Fleischer, 13 March 2003, 
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030313-13.html>; C. Banham & M. 




to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the 
peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and 
to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and 
international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which 
might lead to a breach of the peace. 
 
However, such police actions are only allowed to suppress a breach of international law. 
What had Iraq done? It had not invaded or threatened a neighbour. But it had defied, or at 
least obfuscated and obstructed, UN arms inspections designed to ensure Iraqi compliance 
with the resolutions of the Security Council which dealt with Iraq’s invasion of and 
subsequent expulsion from Kuwait, particularly resolutions 678 and 687. This was seen by the 
US, and those states which supported it, as sufficient to justify war on the basis that Iraq had 
violated the ‘ceasefire’ at the conclusion of the 1991 Gulf War. 
  
 
8 PRE-EMPTIVE SELF-DEFENCE? 
 
The US-led coalition finally took action in March 2003, acting partly in reliance on article 51 
of the UN Charter.46 The international legal standard for whether a particular use of force is 
justified in self-defence comes from an 1837 incident where British subjects destroyed an 
American ship, the Caroline, in a US port, because the Caroline had been used in American 
raids into Canadian territory.47 The British claimed the attack was in self-defence. Through an 
exchange of diplomatic notes, the dispute was resolved in favour of the Americans. US 
Secretary of State Daniel Webster urged the following definition of self-defence, which the 
British accepted:  
 
There must be a necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of 
means, and no moment for deliberation. [The means of self-defence must involve] 
nothing unreasonable or excessive; since the act, justified by the necessity of self-
defence, must be limited by that necessity, and kept clearly within it.48 
 
It is hard to see how the US action against Iraq in 2003 could satisfy this test, unless there 
was evidence that Iraq intended using weapons of mass destruction on its neighbours or the 
US itself. If that was the case, the UN arms inspectors did not uncover clear evidence of it.49 
Nor have subsequent US investigations disclosed clear evidence of the presence of these 
weapons in Iraq at the relevant time.50 With the passage of time is seems increasingly 
probable that Iraq did indeed destroy any remaining stocks of banned weapons some years 
before the US-led invasion of 2003. 
                                                          
46 Press Briefing by Ari Fleischer, 13 March 2003, 
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030313-13.html>. 
47 The Caroline Case, 29 B.F.S.P. 1137-1138; 30 B.F.S.P. 195-196. 
48 Letter from Secretary of State Daniel Webster to Lord Ashburton, 6 August 1842, in J.B. 
Moore (ed), A Digest of International Law (1906) 409, 412. 
49  D. Ensor, ‘Fake Iraq documents “embarrassing” for U.S.’, CNN Washington Bureau, 14 
March 2003, <http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/03/14/sprj.irq.documents/index.html>. 
50 ‘Uproar after US admits Iraq’s terror weapons may not exist’, New Zealand Herald, 30 
May 2003, A1; M. Steel, ‘Prepare for more hallucinations from the Gulf War Syndrome’, 
New Zealand Herald, 30 May 2003, A18. 
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Until the Caroline case,51 self-defence was a political justification for what, from a legal 
perspective, were ordinary acts of war. The positivist international law of the 19th century 
rejected natural law distinctions between just and unjust wars. Military aggression was 
unregulated and conquest gave good title to territory.52 The Caroline case did nothing to 
prevent aggression, but it did draw a legal distinction between aggressive war and military 
action in self-defence. As long as the act being defended against was not itself an act of war, 
peace would be maintained – a matter of considerable importance to relatively weak states, as 
the United States then was – and Iraq was in 2003.  
However, the Bush doctrine makes no attempt to satisfy the criteria of the Caroline case; 
there is no suggestion of waiting for a ‘necessity of self-defence’ that is ‘instant, 
overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment of deliberation’. The US 
President is not ‘reserving a right’ to respond to imminent threats; he is seeking an extension 
of the right of self-defence to include action against potential future dangers. The distinction 
between a state of war, and a state of peace, is thereby blurred. 
It has been argued that the right of self-defence should not be seen as having been 
restricted by the UN Charter: 
 
The history of Article 51 suggests ... that the article should safeguard the right of self-
defence, not restrict it... furthermore, it is a restriction [no right of anticipation] which 
bears no relation to the realities of a situation which may arise prior to an actual attack 
and call for self-defence immediately if it is to be of any avail at all. No state can be 
expected to await an initial attack which, in the present state of armaments, may well 
destroy the state’s capacity for further resistance and so jeopardise its very existence.53 
 
However, it would seem that there must still be the elements of urgency, immediacy and 
the absence of credible alternatives to war.54 A modern version of the Caroline approach is 
described in Oppenheim’s International Law: 55 
 
The development of the law, particularly in the light of more recent state practice, in the 
150 years since the Caroline incident suggests that action, even if it involves the use of 
armed force and the violation of another state’s territory, can be justified as self defence 
under international law where: 
an armed attack is launched, or is immediately threatened, against a state’s territory or 
forces (and probably its nationals);  
there is an urgent necessity for defensive action against that attack;  
there is no practicable alternative to action in self-defence, and in particular another 
state or other authority which has the legal powers to stop or prevent the infringement 
does not, or cannot, use them to that effect;  
                                                          
51 For more on this case see K. Stevens, Border Diplomacy: The Caroline and McLeod Affairs 
in Anglo-American-Canadian Relations, 1837 — 1842 (1989).  
52 See, for instance, Lyons Corp v East India Co (1836) 1 Moo PCC 175, 272, 274; 12 ER 
782; Freeman v Fairlie (1828) 1 Moo Ind Ap 305, 324, 345; 18 ER 117; 1 Bl Com 104 (PC); 
Campbell v Hall (1774) 1 Cowp 204; 20 State Tr 239, 328-329 (KB).  
53 D.W. Bowett, Self-Defence in International Law (1958) 188-192. 
54 D.W. Greig, ‘Self-Defence and the Security Council: What does Article 51 require?’ (1991) 
40 ICLQ 366; K.H. Kaikobad, ‘Self-Defence, Enforcement Action and the Gulf Wars, 1980-
88 and 1990-91’ (1992) 63 British Year Book of International Law 299.  
55 Sir Robert Jennings & Sir Arthur Watts (eds) (9th ed, 1991) 412. 
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the action taken by way of self-defence is limited to what is necessary to stop or prevent 
the infringement, i.e. to the needs of defence … (Emphasis added.) 
 
Iraq had not attacked any state, nor is there any evidence whatever that an attack by Iraq 
was imminent. Therefore self-defence did not justify the use of force against Iraq by the 
United States or any state. Potential capacity to attack the US, real or imagined, is an 
insufficient basis for action. Furthermore, article 51 requires that any exercise of self-defence 
is subject to the Security Council taking measures to maintain international peace and 
security, and indeed requires that any action in self-defence be reported to the Security 
Council. 
 Even if one puts article 51 aside, self-defence would appear to require, as a bare 
minimum, credible evidence of not merely capacity to strike, but also of an intention to do so, 
on the part of the government of the state to be attacked in pre-emptive self-defence. For, 
although a desire to rid the world of a tyrant may be a laudable intention, and ought perhaps 
to be allowed by international law, this was not the ground upon which the war was waged.56 
It may however be possible to assert that the Caroline test is no longer relevant, 
particularly in situations where national authorities have to determine – perhaps on the basis 
of restricted intelligence – that a country is a threat to peace generally, or specifically to one’s 
one nationals. This would be particularly valid in the case of weapons of mass destruction. 
The immediacy of the threat would not necessarily be as significant as the magnitude of the 
threat. This would, of course, be justified in theoretical terms rather than in reliance on a 
historical justification (such as the UN Charter).  
This would be entirely appropriate given that the Caroline test for pre-emptive self-defence 
is itself largely a customary justification of self-defence and only partly enshrined in the UN 
Charter. If the UN Charter is inadequate in the provisions allowing self-defence then it may 
well be proper for countries to fall back upon customary law – provided the justification is the 
prevention of war and not its initiation.  
 
 
9 THE ‘WAR ON TERRORISM’ 
 
The invasion of Iraq must be seen in its wider context, both legal and political. This can be 
traced back to 1991. Perhaps more importantly, the 11 September 2001 attacks on US cities 
caused a psychological reaction in the US, which was echoed by the actions of its 
government. This reaction, the response of the UN, and the operations in Afghanistan which 
followed, were noted by the author in the New Zealand Armed Forces Law Review in 2002.57  
It may be that the threat of terrorism does change the legal situation to some extent. What 
actually happened in the Security Council following the attacks of 11 September 2001 looks 
quite different from what was conceived in the UN Charter. It also represents a watershed in 
the Security Council’s practice. The Council passed two resolutions on the matter within a 
                                                          
56 Though the US argued – as the invasion neared – that the exile of Saddam Hussein – 
something not required by any of the UN resolutions – would alone prevent a US attack on 
Iraq; Institute for International Law for Peace and Humanitarian Law of the Ruhr-University 
Bochum, Germany, ‘Getting Saddam off the Island – The Legality of Regime Change’, 
BOFAXE No 243E, 21 March 2003. 
57 See N. Cox, ‘Developments in the Laws of War: NATO attacks on Yugoslavia and the use 
of force to achieve humanitarian objectives’ [2002] NZAFLR 13. 
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few days.58 Resolution 1368 characterised the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington 
as a ‘threat to peace’, and recognised the right of individual and collective self-defence. It also 
declared the Council’s readiness to authorise military action. A second Security Council 
resolution adopted a few days later, resolution 1373, reaffirmed once again the right of 
individual self-defence and characterised ‘any future terrorist attack to come’ as a threat to 
international peace.59  
The behaviour of the Security Council can itself perhaps be described as anomalous – if 
not contradictory. In the first place, it recognised the right of self-defence without having 
determined an act of aggression. Failing to fulfil this precondition, the resolutions jumped the 
formal link between this notion and aggression. The right of self-defence can only be lawfully 
invoked in response to an armed attack. However, the terrorist attacks were characterised as a 
‘threat to peace’, which does not in itself necessarily justify self-defence as a matter of law (or 
logic).60 A state is only empowered to act in self-defence after having been the victim of an 
armed attack, and not when it merely confronts ‘a threat to peace’.  
More importantly, as explained above, a state or coalition of states can only invoke the 
right of self-defence for a limited period of time, normally ‘until the Security Council has 
taken the necessary measures’. Contrary to this provision, in resolution 1373 the Security 
Council took a set of measures while recognising the persistence of the United States’ right of 
self-defence. Although resolution 1368 had expressed the Security Council’s readiness to 
authorise military action, this authorisation never materialised. The Security Council could 
have easily authorised the victim of an armed attack, alone or in conjunction with other states, 
to use force against the aggressor. This is not only permitted,61 but also usual practice. It was 
done before in the Korean War in 1950, and more recently in the 1991 Gulf War. In both 
instances, a coalition of states, led by the US, aided the state attacked acting in self-defence. 
However the Security Council did not issue any authorisation. This effectively left the 
operation entirely to the US to direct as it saw fit – with the tacit approval of the UN. In both 
situations the UN security system did not operate as it was designed to do. But the end result 
was the limitation of war. 
 The Security Council’s reaction to the 11 September 2001 events set a precedent allowing 
states to use forcible measures in response to terrorist attacks. This represents a breakthrough 
                                                          
58 Resolution 1368 was adopted on 12 September and Resolution 1373 on 28 September 
2001. 
59 This second resolution also entails a comprehensive package of measures to combat 
international terrorism, all of them non-military in nature. The package is so far reaching that 
it is said to go beyond the competence of the Security Council. See L. Condorelli, ‘Les 
attentats du 11 Septembre et leurs suites: Où va le Droit International?’ (2001) 4 Révue 
Général de Droit International Public 829-848. 
60 There is some consensus that the attacks are best characterised as crimes against humanity 
rather than as threats to peace. See A. Cassese, ‘Terrorism is Also Disrupting Some Crucial 
Legal Categories of International Law’ (2001) 12(5) European Journal of International Law 
993-1002. However, it has been noted that both characterisations are not necessarily 
exclusive. See S. Murphy, ‘Terrorism and the Concept of ‘Armed Attack’ in article 51 of the 
UN Charter’ (2001) 43(1) Harvard International Law Journal 41. 
61 The Security Council in unable to enforce such a mandate itself. Article 43 of the Charter 
prescribes that: ‘Members of the United Nations ... undertake to make available to the 
Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed 
forces, assistance, and facilities’. However, these agreements have never been signed. 
Consequently, Security Council resolutions have always been enforced by member states 
through an authorisation, which is equally lawful. 
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in the jus ad bellum in more than one sense. First, it accepted a broadening of the use of force 
in self-defence, since it can apparently now be invoked in cases of terrorist attacks. The 
notion of self-defence appears to have evolved to include the repulsion not only of attacks 
carried out by states, but also by terrorist organisations. The Security Council practice 
regarding international terrorism explained above gives an idea of the magnitude of this 
novelty.62  
Second, a non-state actor – a terrorist network – has been accommodated in the regulation 
of this right. For the first time, it can lawfully be the object of actions conducted in the 
exercise of the right of self-defence.  
Third, it also represents a certain modification of the understanding of state responsibility. 
To date, states had an international duty to ‘refrain from organising, instigating, assisting or 
participating in terrorist acts in another state or acquiescing in organised activities within its 
territory directed towards the commission of such acts’.63 The refusal of some states to 
extradite indicted terrorists had also on occasion been subject to condemnation by the 
Security Council, which characterised it as a ‘threat to peace and security’.64 The novelty is 
that it appears that the breach of this duty can now justify the use of force in the territory of 
the harbouring state. While the state of Afghanistan was not made directly responsible for the 
attacks emanating from the terrorist organisation al-Qaeda, the forcible measures carried out 
in response were inflicted on Afghan territory. The Council’s approach suggests that the fact 
that the harbouring state promoted or merely acquiesced in the existence of terrorists warrants 
the violation of its territory. For the purpose of legitimising the use of force, harbouring 
terrorist cells is apparently equated with an armed attack. 
This rationale might be extended to the Iraqi regime. The difficulty with this is that there 
was no notion of immediacy, and little evidence that Iraq posed a threat to the US.65 More 
importantly, the Security Council, far from authorising the US action, had already taken 
specific non-military action against Iraq, and was still deliberating the nature of the next steps 
to be taken when the US took unilateral action. However, customary law would arguably give 
the US the right to defend itself in the absence of specific authorisation, if faced with a 
genuine threat, if the UN failed to act in circumstances in which it should have done so.  
 
 
10 IMPLICIT AUTHORISATION OF FORCE BY THE UN 
 
While there is no doubt that article 51 of the UN Charter directly authorises the use of force in 
certain circumstances (apparently now including attacks by terrorists), its target in this case 
was more problematic, for Iraq was not clearly linked to al-Qaeda (although many people in 
the US were led to believe that it was).  
Even if Iraq was in material breach of Security Council resolution 1441,66 that did not 
authorise unilateral US action,67 though there were valiant efforts to show that it did, initially 
                                                          
62 In general, this matter has always been difficult to handle at UN level, given the lack of 
agreement as to how to define the term ‘terrorism’.  Obviously, most Third World countries 
rejected any definition which would characterise as terrorism efforts by colonised peoples to 
resist foreign rule. 
63 UN General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970. 
64 See Security Council resolution 1267 (1999) concerning the demands on the Taliban 
regime to extradite terrorists. 
65 See Ensor. 
66 Which required compliance with resolutions 661, 678, 686, 687, 688, 707, 715, 986 and 
1284. 
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by British68 and then by Australian authorities.69 This was perhaps more important for the 
latter two states, as their military commanders in the field, and even their political leadership, 
were potentially liable to prosecution before the new International Criminal Court for waging 
an unlawful war.70 
The UK Government relied upon resolution 1441 to justify military action.71 The reasoning 
for this position was as follows: Authority to use force against Iraq existed from the combined 
effect of resolutions 678, 687 and 1441, all of which were adopted for the express purpose of 
restoring international peace and security. In resolution 678 the Security Council authorised 
force against Iraq, to eject it from Kuwait and to restore peace and security in the area.  In 
resolution 687, which set out the ceasefire conditions after Operation Desert Storm, the 
Security Council imposed continuing obligations on Iraq to eliminate its weapons of mass 
destruction in order to restore international peace and security in the area. Resolution 687 
suspended but did not terminate the authority to use force under resolution 678. A material 
breach of resolution 687 revived the authority to use force under resolution 678. 
 According to the UK Attorney-General, resolution 1441 was worded in such a way that a 
further decision of the Security Council to sanction force was not required.72 Thus, all that 
resolution 1441 required was reporting to and discussion by the Security Council of Iraq’s 
failures, but not an express further decision to authorise force. 
The difficulty with the analysis which was offered was that it presupposed that an 
authorisation of force, once made, limited the role of the Security Council.73 While Iraq 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
67 Powell:  
 
There were some nations who insisted [during the Security Council debate prior to the 
passage of resolution 1441] that a second resolution would be required. And we insisted 
that a second resolution would not be required. And as we negotiated our way through 
that, we made it absolutely clear that we did not believe that the resolution as it finally 
passed would require a second resolution. 
 
However, the resolution, in particular paragraph 13 (which recalls ‘that the Council has 
repeatedly warned Iraq that it will face serious consequences as a result of its continued 
violations of its obligations’) must be interpreted in good faith and in the light of the fact that 
enforcement action under Chapter VII of the UN Charter is an exception to the principle of 
the peaceful settlement of disputes and the prohibition of the use of force in international 
relations: N. Grief, ‘On the legality of a military strike against Iraq’, 19 December 2002, 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/today/reports/international/antistrike_argument.shtml>. 
68 The Times statement. It seems that the legal advice backing this claim of legality was not 
unanimous: E. MacAskill, ‘Adviser quits Foreign Office over legality of war’, Guardian 
(London), 22 March 2003. 
69 ‘Memorandum of Advice on the Use of Force Against Iraq, provided by the Attorney 
General’s Department and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 18 March 2003’, 
<http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/03/19/1047749818043.html>. 
70 The US and Iraq have not ratified the Rome Statute, which established the Court, but the 
UK and Australia have.  
71 The Times statement. 
72 Idem. 
73 The role of the UN Security Council does not cease merely because it has passed a 
resolution concerning a specific problem: V. Gowlland-Debbas, ‘Security Council 
Enforcement Action and Issues of State Responsibility’ (1994) 43 ICLQ 55; C. Gray, ‘After 
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continued to respect the Iraq-Kuwait border, it had failed to disarm in the manner demanded 
of it. However, it is doubtful that this automatically authorised military intervention to enforce 
disarmament.74 Only a serious breach of the ceasefire terms, such as an attack upon Kuwait, 
could automatically revive the operation of those Security Council resolutions authorising the 
use of all necessary means to expel Iraq from Kuwait and restore regional peace and 
security.75 This would require the UN Security Council to consider the matter, and authorise 
action if appropriate. In the words of Professor Hilary Charlesworth:76 
 
To trace original authority for the use of force in 678 to current circumstances goes 
against the plain meaning of words and against the whole fabric of the UN charter. 
 
Professor Charlesworth went further and accused the US, UK and Australian 
Governments’ lawyers of selectively using phrases from UN resolutions to support their 
case.77 The difficulty is that diplomatic, political, and military factors meant that the precise 
role of the UN, and by extension, of international law, was being publicly challenged and 
questioned. In such circumstances it is difficult to discern precise legal principles. 
Associate Professor Don Rothwell said that resolution 1441 had expressly left it to the 
Security Council to determine whether there had been a breach by Iraq severe enough to 
justify the use of force.78 
Nor was the American and allied legal position strengthened by the repeated assertions by 
US government figures in the last phase of pre-war diplomatic manoeuvring, that the exile of 
Saddam Hussein – something not required by any of the resolutions – would alone prevent a 
US attack on Iraq.79 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
the Ceasefire: Iraq, the Security Council and the Use of Force’ (1994) 65 British Year Book of 
International Law 135. 




We have said all along that this idea [of automatic authorisation of force] was 
dangerous. UNSCR 1441 is geared to the peaceful disarmament of Iraq, clearly saying 
that the use of force can be only a final resort. 
 
See also Banham, ‘Experts at odds as PM releases legal advice’. 
75 Rothwell, ‘US and its allies threaten rule of international law’. 
76 Banham.  
77 Idem. 
78 C. Banham, ‘Experts at odds as PM releases legal advice’, 19 March 2003, 
<http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/03/18/1047749774530.html>; Public Issues 
Committee of the Auckland District Law Society, ‘International law, the United Nations and 
Iraq’, <http://www.adls.org.nz/public/media/media6.asp>; ‘New York City Bar Urges No US 
Military Action in Iraq 
Without UN Security Council Authorization’, 15 October 2002, 
<http://www.abcny.org/currentarticle/abcny_%20Urges_No_US_Military.html>.  
79 Institute for International Law for Peace and Humanitarian Law of the Ruhr-University 
Bochum, Germany, ‘Getting Saddam off the Island – The Legality of Regime Change’, 
BOFAXE No 243E, 21 March 2003. 
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It was certainly arguable that it was US aggression which would – and indeed did – 
heighten regional tension.80 Indeed, resolution 1441 was clearly written in a way which 
required the Security Council to consider any Iraqi breach, and consider the consequences 
(which were identified as potentially ‘serious’).81 While the Security Council failed to 
authorise military force against Iraq, that did not mean the world security system had failed. It 
meant that the members of the Security Council could not agree that force was justified. In the 
absence of a Security Council authorisation of force, the use of force was contrary to 
established international law. 
The Security Council had assumed responsibility regarding Iraq, and it was for the Security 
Council to decide, unambiguously and specifically, that force was required for enforcement of 
its requirements. Taking a contextual approach, past Security Council resolutions authorising 
use of force have employed language generally understood to do so.  This was the case with 
Korea in 1950,82 and Kuwait, Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda and Bosnia in the 1990s.83 In all these 
instances, the Security Council responded to actual invasion, large-scale violence, or 
humanitarian emergency, not to potential threats. 
Any claim that ‘material breach’ of ceasefire obligations by Iraq justifies the use of force 
by the United States is unconvincing. The 1991 Gulf War was an action authorised by the 
Security Council, not an interstate conflict; accordingly, it was for the Security Council to 
determine whether there had been a material breach and whether such a breach required the 
renewed use of force. 
Strained interpretations of Security Council resolutions, especially when opposed, as in the 
case of Iraq, by a majority of other Security Council members, cannot overcome those 
fundamental principles. Rather, given the values embedded in the Charter, the burden is on 
those who claim the right to use force to show that it is authorised.84 
 
 
11 DIPLOMATIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE WAR 
 
The United States chose to take what was effectively unilateral action because it had decided 
that this was in the best interests of the US. Speaking of Iraq, President Bush said that: 85  
 
                                                          
80 This is shown, for instance, by Turkey moving troops into northern Iraq; ‘Turkey opens 
airspace but invades northern Iraq’, Straits Times (Singapore), 22 March 2003. 
81 The representative of France welcomed the two-stage approach required by the resolution, 
saying that the concept of ‘automaticity’ for the use of force had been eliminated: ‘Security 
Council holds Iraq in ‘Material breach’ of disarmament obligations, offers final chance to 
comply, unanimously adopting resolution 1441 (2002)’, Press Release SC/7564, 8 November 
2002. 
82 Prior to General Assembly action, Security Council resolution 83 recommended that UN 
member states provide ‘such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel 
the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area’.  
83 ‘All necessary means’ or ‘all measures necessary’.  
84 For these and other reasons why existing Security Council resolutions did not authorize use 
of force against Iraq, see J. Lobel & M. Ratner, ‘Bypassing the Security Council: Ambiguous 
Authorizations to Use Force, Cease-Fires and the Iraqi Inspection Regime’ (1999) 93 
American Journal of International Law 124-154; R. Singh & A. Macdonald, ‘Legality of use 
of force against Iraq: Opinion’, 10 September 2002, 
<www.lcnp.org/global/IraqOpinion10.9.02.pdf>. 
85 ‘President Says Saddam Hussein Must Leave Iraq Within 48 Hours’, ibid. 
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The regime has a history of reckless aggression in the Middle East. It has a deep hatred 
of America and our friends. And it has aided, trained and harboured terrorists, including 
operatives of al Qaeda.  
 
Importantly, this last accusation – though important – remained unproven. The “deep 
hatred of America” is not a justification for military action. It is in his next sentences that the 
president provided what was the most significant justification for the war:  
 
The United States of America has the sovereign authority to use force in assuring its 
own national security. That duty falls to me, as Commander-in-Chief, by the oath I have 
sworn, by the oath I will keep. 
Recognizing the threat to our country, the United States Congress voted 
overwhelmingly last year to support the use of force against Iraq. America tried to work 
with the United Nations to address this threat because we wanted to resolve the issue 
peacefully. 86 
 
National security – as determined (not surprisingly) by the US, required military action 
against Iraq. Whether or not international law sanctioned it, or the international community 
approved, if US authorities determined that a country was a threat, the US was morally 
justified in taking action. This might be said to provide theoretical (rather than historical) 
justification for war. In a telling remark, the President continued:87 
 
Under Resolutions 678 and 687 – both still in effect – the United States and our allies 
are authorized to use force in ridding Iraq of weapons of mass destruction. This is not a 
question of authority; it is a question of will. 
Many nations, however, do have the resolve and fortitude to act against this threat to 
peace, and a broad coalition is now gathering to enforce the just demands of the world. 
The United Nations Security Council has not lived up to its responsibilities, so we will 
rise to ours. 
 
This world view required pre-emptive action, even if the Security Council failed to 
authorise it; indeed, if the UN failed to act when action was justified, it was morally 
incumbent upon the US and like-minded countries to take action. However, it was 
questionable whether the action taken reflected the views of the majority of the international 
community.88 Speaking just prior to the outbreak of war the French President Jacques Chirac 
said that: 89  
 
France’s action has been inspired by the primacy of international law, and guided by its 
understanding of the nature of relations between peoples and nations. 
Faithful to the spirit of the UN charter, which is our common law, France considers the 
use of force is a last resort when all other options have been exhausted. France’s stance 
is shared by the great majority of the international community. 
                                                          
86 ‘President Says Saddam Hussein Must Leave Iraq Within 48 Hours’, ibid. 
87Idem. 
88 For example, China maintained that the attacks occurred ‘in disregard for the opposition of 
the international community’, The Times (London), 20 March 2003. 
89 18 March 2003 (translated by BBC Monitoring Service), 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2860715.stm>. 
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The latest discussions clearly showed that the Security Council was not disposed in the 
current circumstances to sanction a rush towards war. 
 
Not only was the action of doubtful legality, it was also possibly not justified 
diplomatically:90 
 
The United States has just given Iraq an ultimatum. Whether it is a question – I repeat – 
of the necessary disarming of Iraq or the desirable change of regime in that country, 
there is no justification here for a unilateral decision to resort to war. 
However events develop in the near future, this ultimatum calls into question the notion 
that we have of international relations. It commits the future of a people, the future of a 
region, and the stability of the world. 
It is a grave decision at a time when the disarmament of Iraq is under way and the 
inspections have proved they were a credible alternative for disarming that country. 
It is also a decision which compromises – for the future – the methods for peacefully 
resolving crises linked to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Iraq does not 
today represent an immediate threat such as to justify an immediate war. 
To act without the legitimacy of the United Nations, to favour the use of force over law, 
is taking a serious responsibility. 
 
A similar position was taken by the German Chancellor, Gerhard Schroeder: 91 
 
The world is on the eve of war. 
My question has been and remains: does the scale of the threat from the Iraqi dictator 
justify the launch of a war that will certainly bring death to thousands of innocent men, 
women and children? 
My answer in this case has been and remains: No. 
Iraq today is a country that is under comprehensive UN supervision. The disarmament 
steps that the UN Security Council has demanded are being increasingly fulfilled. 
 
Which perspective was correct? If the difference is merely one of interpretation of 
diplomatic realities, then the scope of international law is narrowed. Should it be the role of 
the international community – perhaps led by the UN – to determine what conduct constitutes 
a grave enough threat to security to justify war? The US would undoubtedly say no. Given 
that the threats to world security today come from terrorism, and smaller rouge states, rather 
than from superpower or great power rivalry, the UN may no longer be the appropriate 
agency. However, norms of international law do remain, and these do restrict the freedom of 
countries to levy war. 
International law restricted the use of force – but the Security Council may have been too 
slow (certainly it was in American eyes) in dealing with Iraq. Should any state have the right 
to enforce justice, or its own perception of justice, irrespective of the view of the Security 
Council? This question has particular importance in an age without effective superpower 
rivalry or great power blocks, which served to balance one another during the Cold War. One 
nation alone has sufficient resources to act contrary to the wishes of the majority of the 
international community.  
 
 




12 THE ROLE OF THE UN AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS IN THE 
‘NEW WORLD ORDER’ 
 
The US is the sole superpower, though this term is now perhaps meaningless. In terms of 
defence expenditure alone the US was far ahead of any of the other participants in the 2003 
Iraq war, or of the great powers in general.92 Any democratic state must be able to point to 
legal and moral justification for undertaking offensive action. The moral arguments for 
waging war on Iraq would have been stronger if convincing evidence had been available 
regarding Iraq’s possession of weapons of mass destruction and/or links to terrorists groups.93 
The legal arguments put forward did not bear close scrutiny. But the fact that the US 
sought, however reluctantly, to justify its action, gives some hope for the future. We cannot 
yet be sure what lessons can be learnt. In the longer term it would be desirable if this war 
were to be seen as an aberration, rather than as setting a precedent or developing customary 
international law. For it departs in too many particulars from pre-existing international law, 
and opens up too many possibilities for conflict. Unfortunately, such aberrations are 
becoming distressingly common and may in time create a custom which the world would be 
better without. 
The Security Council may be imperfect, but it should be improved rather than discarded. 
The lesson must be that the Security Council, and the associated security system, remains our 
best option for preserving world peace, but that international law will, and indeed must, adapt 
to take into account political realities – including the economic, military, and political 
dominance of the US on the world stage. Whether the invasion of Iraq will ultimately be held 
to have been lawful may have profound repercussions for the future of international law and 
the UN. 
The invasion was initially seen by many as a grave threat to international law. The sole 
superpower was ignoring established customary law and utilising a strained interpretation of 
the UN Charter to justify action. Subsequent developments – particularly the increasing 
evidence that Iraq did not have weapons of mass destruction, and the difficulties facing the 
occupation forces – could have been cited as proof that the US acted improperly. Yet calls for 
the US – or the UK and Australia – to be penalised for their actions have failed to materialise. 
The reasons for this may not be hard to find. 
Four years ago, Joseph Lorenz, a retired senior US foreign service officer, with extensive 
experience centred on the United Nations and the Middle East, published a study entitled 
Peace, Power and the United Nations – A Security System for the Twenty-first Century.94 This 
book was a serious discussion, in the context of post-Cold War international politics, of 
alternative collective security systems and means of policing wars within states. It was an 
analysis of modern collective security operations, and outlines a practical design for reviving 
the United Nation’s battered capacity to deter aggression and nurture wider peace.  
In light of subsequent American action, it may be instructive to look at Lorenz’ thesis. He 
begins with an outline of the history of collective security and the related concept of balance 
of power. This involves a discussion of the failure of the League of Nations. But this book is 
not concerned with history, it proposes a new approach. As Lorenz reads the situation, the 
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United Nations approach to crisis management is built on an out-dated premise. The collapse 
of the Soviet Union, regional challenges to the economic and political interests of the major 
powers, the increase in membership of the UN, all open the way for a smaller, cheaper, more 
realistic UN force, more realistic in expectation, and more credible in deterrence than the first 
fifty years of the organisation. 
The reason for this, in Lorenz’ view, is simple. The UN was designed to prevent global 
war. There is not now the same fear of this as there was in 1945-46 when the UN Charter was 
written. This is reflected in the grey area between collective security and traditional 
peacekeeping which has been apparent in the most sensitive UN missions since the Gulf War.  
What Lorenz calls for is nothing less than the structural adjustment of the international 
security system, to recognise that great power rivalry is no longer the single greatest threat to 
the people of this planet. Unfortunately Lorenz offers little by way of suggestions for the form 
of this “new order”. But he is not one to advocate unilateralism. 
It may be that this particular war was unjustified – and even illegal – but the principle that 
a sovereign state may sometimes breach the laws of war and not be punished, seems to have 
developing. Traditionally the laws of war were concerned with the regulation of warfare,95 
usually, though not exclusively, state warfare.96 Additionally, since the nineteenth century 
there has been significant growth in the laws of humanity, or human rights.97 It may be that 
the Iraq war is further evidence that these two strands have joined.98 There has been much 
concentration on humanitarian law, and especially the punishment of war criminals.99  
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Few had sympathy for Saddam Hussein or his regime. Whatever the weakness of the legal 
justification for the invasion, relatively few (at least outside the Middle East, where American 
motives are often misdoubted) doubted that the allies were motivated by a desire to rid the 
region and the world of a particularly unpleasant dictator. The UN was perhaps not the best 
organ to oversee such a project, given the variable human rights records of many UN member 
states. But the UN itself may be seen as more significant than the sum of its members. The 
difficulty is the US was openly opposed to the UN – and the US was by far the largest 





It is too early to be sure what effect, if any, the US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq will 
have on international law. However, it has served to remind us that international law is 
evolutionary, and is not primarily legalistic. It is applied theory and primarily practice-driven. 
But it is not without a moral context.  
The theoretical aspect of the laws of war is concerned with ethically justifying war. The 
historical aspect, or the “just war tradition” deals with the historical body of rules or 
agreements applied in various wars. It is this latter aspect which has been dealt a blow by US 
action in Iraq. The task now for governments, and international lawyers, is to attempt to 
revitalise global security system while bearing in mind the new strategic realities. This will 
require some measure of consensus as to the proper balance of national sovereign autonomy, 
and international collectivity. It may be seen that post-war US difficulties in Iraq has already 
compelled the US to largely abandon unilateralism in favour of multilateralism. It may be 
expected that the global security system will evolve in much the manner as hitherto – 
occasional false moves, but a general tendency towards the control of warfare and the 
globalisational of security. Once again it may be an opportune time for a new Grotius to 
review the state of public international law, and assist us to clarify the nature of the law by 
which we are governed. 
The historical basis of law may have swung back in favour of 19th century statism. As in 
many 19th century cases self-interest is the ostensible basis of action – the world-view of self-
defence is predominant.  
But the effect of law is to force legalism to the forefront of public awareness, unlike during 
WW2 or even the Korean War. Thus the solution may be to emphasise the importance of the 
role of the legal system, whether based on the UN, or regional security. But at the same time 
it will not exclude the possibility of the single-state approach, but may render unilateral action 
less likely. This could be a gradual de-emphasising of the process (based on the historic 
approach) in favour of principle (based on the theoretical approach), allowing states greater 
flexibility. The danger then would be that principle may be readily accepted (though even this 
is doubtful) but how this works in practice is uncertain. 
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